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Abstract
While the adoption of connected vehicles is growing, security and privacy concerns are
still the key barriers raised by society. These concerns mandate automakers and standard-
ization groups to propose convenient solutions for privacy preservation. One of the main
proposed solutions is the use of Pseudonym-Changing Strategies (PCSs). However, ETSI
has recently published a technical report which highlights the absence of standardized and
efficient PCSs [1]. This alarming situation mandates an innovative shift in the way that the
privacy of end-users is protected during their journey. Software Defined Networking (SDN)
is emerging as a key 5G enabler to manage the network in a dynamic manner. SDN-enabled
wireless networks are opening up new programmable and highly-flexible privacy-aware so-
lutions. We exploit this paradigm to propose an innovative software-defined location pri-
vacy architecture for vehicular networks. The proposed architecture is context-aware, pro-
grammable, extensible, and able to encompass all existing and future pseudonym-changing
strategies. To demonstrate the merit of our architecture, we consider a case study that
involves four pseudonym-changing strategies, which we deploy over our architecture and
compare with their static implementations. We also detail how the SDN controller dynam-
ically switches between the strategies according to the context.
Keywords: 5G, Vehicular Networks, Software Defined Networking, Location privacy,
Pseudonym-Changing
1 Introduction
As part of the vision of 5G, connected vehicles will be an important pillar of Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems (ITS), with the aim to ensure road safety, avoid traffic congestion and provide
a better driving experience for users during their journey. Although the deployment stage for
connected vehicles is imminent, many security and privacy issues are still unsolved. Location
privacy is one of the main issues that may impede the wide acceptance of vehicular networks.
Indeed, location tracking of vehicles may reveal every place visited by drivers. This is because
there is generally a one-to-one relationship between the vehicle and its driver. The visited lo-
cations may include very personal places like hospitals, banks, insurance companies, etc. and
hence can reveal sensitive information about the end-user.
On the other hand, the main wireless communication technologies for connected vehicles,
such as IEEE802.11p, present several privacy concerns. Indeed, IEEE802.11p mandates that
each connected vehicle should frequently send a safety message, called CAM (Cooperative
Awareness Message), to ensure cooperative awareness among neighboring vehicles. These mes-
sages include sensitive information such as identifiers, positions, speeds, etc, and are sent in
clear text; hence vehicles could be tracked on the basis of the information transmitted by the
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications. To mitigate this
privacy risk, the use of pseudonym schemes has received significant interest from the research
community and standardization authorities. For instance, both the European standard ETSI
TS 102 941 [1] and the American standard SAE J2735 [2] have adopted a pseudonym scheme.
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However, several studies have shown that the use of a simple pseudonym-changing is insufficient
to provide unlinkability between the pseudonyms and have suggested using strategies for chang-
ing the pseudonyms. Although, there is a significant number of proposed Pseudonym-Changing
Strategies (PCSs), there are no recommendations by standardization bodies for PCSs to ap-
ply. The main reasons for this can be summarized as follows: (i) several proposed strategies
are strongly topology-dependent i.e. they could only be applied in a given situation or area
such as signalized intersections, parking lots, and gas stations; (ii) some strategies propose the
use of radio silence without considering its critical impact on the exchange of safety messages,
or dynamically readjusting radio silence duration; (iii) each PCS is evaluated with individual
privacy metrics that may not be suitable for another PCS. This absence of unified evaluation
metrics complicates the comparison between existing strategies; (iv) The scarcity of scientific
studies focusing on the non-cooperation behavior of vehicles. Selfish vehicles could significantly
decrease the efficiency of PCSs; (v) most of the existing PCSs assume a strong global passive
adversary. However, this assumption is not realistic, since the global presence of the adversary
is difficult to achieve due to the large scale of deployment of connected vehicles, and the high
cost of ensuring complete coverage; and (vi) pseudonyms could be easily used to perform Sybil
attacks. This vulnerability is not taken into the account by most of the strategies proposed in
the literature.
One possible solution for dealing with these various PCSs is to propose a comprehensive
architecture that is able to encompass all of them and their intrinsic features. This architecture
should be forward-looking in the sense that it should support future PCS solutions. With this in
mind, we propose a software-defined architecture for location privacy in vehicular networks. This
architecture extends and leverages the concepts of SDN to PCSs and ensures the selection of the
appropriate PCS according to the context of vehicles and other factors, as will be detailed later.
The SDN control plane orchestrates the selection and adjusts the parameters of the selected
strategy dynamically, based on information received from the data plane. The SDN strategy
rules are also forwarded from the control plane to the data plane to ensure the correct execution
of the selected PCS. In the next section, we discuss in detail the standardization efforts related
to pseudonym-changing strategies, their open issues, and explain how our proposed architecture
cope with these issues.
2 Pseudonym-Changing Strategies: Standardization Efforts and
Open Issues
Security standardization bodies have agreed to adopt PCS to protect the location privacy of con-
nected vehicles. However, while in the US, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) suggests
that vehicles change their pseudonym every five minutes [2], the European telecommunications
standardization organization, ETSI, does not suggest the adoption of any PCS [1]. In the light
of this, many PCSs are proposed in the literature. In [3], we presented a comprehensive survey
and classification of these strategies. This paper also highlights open issues and presents rec-
ommendations, including the importance of developing a dynamic system to select the applying
PCS according to the vehicular context. Recently, ETSI published a technical report (ETSI
TR 103 415) [1] that presents a pre-standardization study of PCS. This document surveys the
existing categories of strategies. It also discusses and describes the suggestions of the European
projects (PRESERVE, SCOOP@F, and C2C-CC) regarding PCS. The document identifies the
open issues of PCSs and proposes a set of recommendations addressing these issues. In the
following, we discuss the open issues highlighted in [1, 3] and the related recent advances
• Impact on road safety: as shown in [3], strategies using radio silence are the most
efficient solutions. However, their major drawback is their significant negative impact
on safety-related applications. This was first investigated in [4], where the authors rec-
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ommend that the silent period should be shorter than two seconds and that long silent
periods can result in hazardous situations, since many safety messages will not be trans-
mitted due to radio silence. The ETSI technical report [1] also discusses the problems
of “missing vehicles” and “guest vehicles”. Missing vehicles are those that put radio si-
lence into effect after changing their pseudonyms; at the end of this period, these vehicles
suddenly appear in the LDMs (Local Dynamic Map) of neighboring vehicles. This may
generate unpredictable reactions as highlighted in [1]. In contrast, the problem of the
guest vehicle is observed when a vehicle changes its pseudonym while his old pseudonym
still populates the LDMs of its neighboring vehicles [5]. Subsequently, LDM messages
contain two entries that correspond to the same vehicle, leading to a misinterpretation of
the surrounding environment by neighboring vehicles. Unlike the missing vehicle problem,
the ghost vehicle problem is not only linked to radio silence based strategies, but to PCSs
in general.
• Non-cooperative behavior: by triggering the change of their pseudonyms at the same
time slot, cooperative vehicles ensure a high level of anonymity and create confusion for
the attacker. Consequently, the existence of non-cooperative vehicles will significantly
hinder the efficiency of the PCS specifically under lower vehicular density. The authors of
[6] study PCSs under a non-cooperative environment. They propose a game theory model
and find a Nash equilibrium of the PCS under different types of games (static/dynamic,
with and without complete information). Other works such as [7] and [8] propose incentive
mechanisms to motivate non-cooperative vehicles to participate in the PCS.
• Attacker model: It is not trivial to estimate the power of tracking attackers that may
exist in the future deployment of vehicular networks. Attacker power can be expressed in
terms of tracking capabilities (strong or weak sniffing stations, efficiency of the tracking
algorithm, etc.) and the coverage area. In addition, it is critical to properly define
a realistic attacker model. For this reason, most of proposed PCSs have assumed the
extreme case of the attacker model (global attacker full of capabilities); however, this
assumption is not realistic, because global coverage entails a significant surveillance cost.
Consequently, the authors of [9] propose a mid-sized attacker whose power is in between
that a local attacker and a global one. They also distinguish three tracking periods (i.e
short-term, mid-term, and long-term) and two levels of surveillance granularity (i.e Road-
level and Zone-level).
• Evaluation metrics: many metrics are proposed to assess the performance of PCSs.
The recent study carried out by Zhao et al. [10] show that there is no single privacy
metric that outperforms all others under different contexts (mobility, traffic conditions,
road section, etc.). For this reason, it is recommended to combine all metrics to obtain a
fair performance evaluation of a PCS.
• Privacy model: the privacy level depends mainly on the considered attacker model and
the evaluation metrics. The authors of [6] proposed a linear model to quantify the loss of
privacy after the last change of pseudonym. In this model, the privacy level of vehicles
linearly decreases according to a sensitivity parameter, which characterizes the power of
the adversary. However, this model has two major drawbacks: (i) it does not specify how
the sensitivity parameter is measured. (ii) the linearity of this model is not justified.
• Sybil attacks: In this attack, vehicles use multiple identities, called Sybils, which can
be exploited to create a fake traffic jam and hence to alter other vehicles’ perceptions.
Pseudonyms could be exploited to launch Sybil attacks. The ETSI technical report [1]
gives some recommendations on thwarting Sybil attacks, such as setting the maximum
number of pseudonyms that can be used simultaneously and the minimum duration for
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which the pseudonyms should be used. The technical report also recommends the use of
misbehavior detection systems.
• Pseudonym lock: ETSI standards specify that the PCS could be locked on-demand for
a maximum of 255s, in particular when a critical safety situation occurs. The priority
levels of such a situation are respectively “0” or “1” [11]. PCS locking is also proposed by
the SAE. However, the conditions when the pseudonyms are locked are not yet defined.
• Pseudonym reuse: Although the reuse of pseudonyms minimizes the storage capacity
and facilitates the management of pseudonyms, it can decrease the level of privacy. This
is why the reuse of pseudonyms is not recommended as a privacy best practice. However,
the Car2car consortium considers the reuse of pseudonym while defining some KPI to
increase the privacy level [3].
It is obvious that several issues are still unsolved and need the attention of the research
community to ensure the deployment of PCS in connected vehicles. This urgent need motivates
us to propose a forward-looking architecture that can encompass existing PCSs as well as future
ones. Leveraging Software-Defined Networking (SDN), the proposed architecture is flexible and
enables the efficient integration of new proposed solutions and new functions of the PCS. The
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Integration of SDN into vehicular networks, allowing new PCSs to be deployed, easily
updated and dynamically reconfigured.
• Introduction of novel pseudonym-changing modules in the control plane and the definition
of their different interactions to ensure a context-aware PCS.
• Introduction of novel complementary pseudonym-changing modules in the data plane and
the definition of their interactions.
• Definition of SDN rules (which can be modified dynamically at the controller) to establish
a set of actions that will handle the PCS.
• Definition of a Sybil attack agent to interact with the external misbehavior system con-
troller.
• Definition of self-learning module that is able to analyze and learn from its immediate
context while autonomously adapting the PCS accordingly to ensure a high level of privacy
protection. This module is crucial, as it guarantees network intelligence and leads to a
network that is self-privacy-preserving.
3 Proposed Architecture: Building blocks
Our self-privacy-preserving architecture leverages the SDN paradigm and thus follows its main
principle, which is the separation between the data and the control plane. The control plane
is responsible for dynamically selecting the PCS, adjusting the parameters of strategy, and
planning the strategy rules. On the other hand, the data plane translates the defined rules into
actions to apply the PCS. The communications between the control plane and the data plane
are secure.
3.1 Control Plane
Figure 1 shows the logical modules of the control plane in our architecture. The PCS module
receives a demand from the application layer to provide the location privacy service. This
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module chooses the most convenient PCS to be executed based on the information received
from two modules: the Mobility and Topology module and Attacker Model module. Once the
strategy is selected, the PCS module invokes (i) the Parameter Settings module to request the
parameters of the strategy; (ii) the Incentive Model module to request the appropriate incentive
method to motivate non-cooperative vehicles; and (iii) the Privacy Metric module to request
indicators and KPIs for the evaluation of PCS performance. In the following, we detail these
modules.
Figure 1: The logical modules of the control plane and the interactions between them.
• Road Safety Monitoring: this module monitors road conditions and its impact on
traffic safety. Based on this assessment, the module develops appropriate SDN rules which
are sent to the data plane. In addition, this module provides the necessary information
to the Parameter Settings module to tune the PCS parameters, such as the duration of
radio silence and the lock period.
• Misbehavior Detection System Controller: this is an external component, which
detects misbehaving attacks such as message injection, denial of service (DoS) and Sybil
attacks. The SDN controller of our self-privacy-preserving architecture uses the informa-
tion received from the Misbehavior Detection System Controller to update its parameters
in order to limit Sybil attacks and returns information to help in detecting Sybil attacks
and accurately evaluating the trust levels of vehicles.
• Sybil Attack Agent: this interface is used to interact with the Misbehavior Detection
System Controller, receiving information from it and forwarding it to the Pseudonym
Management module to adjust some PCS parameters. It also receives information from
the Learning module and forwards this to the Misbehavior Detection System Controller
to enhance the attack detection ratio.
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• Pseudonym Management: this module plans the rules that orchestrate the use of
pseudonyms: the reuse of pseudonyms, the frequency of changing of pseudonyms, the
number of pseudonyms that can be used in parallel, etc. This module receives information
from both the Sybil Attack Agent and learning modules and sends the resulting rules to
the Parameter Settings module.
• Privacy Model: This is used to model the loss of privacy of vehicles over time. As
explained in the previous section, the loss of privacy mainly depends on the strength of
the attacker model. For this reason, this module receives input from the Attacker Model
module. The Privacy Model provides input to the Parameter Settings module, which in
return specifies the parameters of the Privacy Model.
• Mobility and Topology: this module monitors the mobility pattern of vehicles and the
road topology in real time.
• Parameter Settings: this module sets the different parameters of the PCS, such as the
duration of the radio silence period and the minimum duration of the use of pseudonyms.
The definition of these parameters is made according to the information received from the
Road Safety, Pseudonym Management, and the Privacy Model modules.
• Attacker Model: this module evaluates the power of the attacker. As discussed in
the previous section, the attacker can be internal or external, local or mid-sized, long-
term. It can perform simple syntactic linking of pseudonyms, but can also carry out more
advanced semantic linking of pseudonyms. This module gets regular updates from the
learning model and sends feedback to the Pseudonym-Changing Strategy module.
• Incentive Model: this module defines the incentive model, which is used to motivate
selfish vehicles to participate in the PCS.
• Privacy Metric: this module defines the privacy metrics used to evaluate the PCS. It
worth mentioning that the privacy metrics can be selected by the PCS to evaluate its own
performance.
• PCS Module: this module defines the strategy to be executed based on the information
received from the Mobility and Topology module and the Attacker Model module. Once
the strategy is selected, this module invokes the Parameter Settings module to obtain
the most appropriate parameters of the selected strategy. This module also invokes the
Privacy Metric module and the Incentive Model module to select the evaluation metric
and the incentive method respectively.
• Learning: this module periodically receives privacy-related information from the data
plane (i.e the privacy levels of vehicles, the presence of an attacker, and the set of selfish
vehicles). This information is analyzed and forwarded to the corresponding modules:
(i) the Attacker Model module to adjust the attacker model being used; (ii) the PCS
module to tune the strategy parameters, and the Incentive Model module, and to select
an additional potential privacy metric. (ii) the Pseudonym Management module to adjust
pseudonym management related parameters, and finally (iv) the Sybil Attack Agent,
which forwards pseudonym-changing information to the Misbehavior Detection System
Controller. The purpose is to support this controller in the accurate detection of Sybil
attacks and trust assessment of vehicles.
6
ar
X
iv
:
so
m
e
ot
h
er
te
x
t
go
es
h
er
e
Figure 2: The logical components of the data plane and the interactions between them.
3.2 Data Plane
The data plane is composed of the different vehicles that are involved in the PCS. Figure 2
depicts the modules of the data plane, which are responsible of the execution of the PCS.
The data plane uses the vehicles’ communication interfaces to collect pertinent information
concerns the surrounding vehicular environment. The data plane sends mobility, safety, and
privacy information to the control plane, while it receives safety and strategy rules. In the
following, we describe the modules and the databases of the data plane:
• Safety Message Management: this module sends and receives pseudonymous safety
messages. It also receives instructions from the Strategy Engine. These instructions vary
according to the applied strategy. In addition, this module provides the status of the
surrounding environment and the impact of the applied PCS to the Road Safety Engine,
the Topology and the Mobility engine, and finally to the Strategy Engine.
• Mobility and Topology Engine: Equipped with a map and GPS, this module sends
the mobility information of the vehicle such as position, speed, and acceleration and the
topology information to the Road Safety Engine and to the control plane.
• SDN Safety Rules: This is a database, which contains the safety rules that are used to
assess road conditions. The rules data is received from the control plane.
• Road Safety Engine: this module receives, stores and updates the safety rules received
from the control plane. These rules are used to evaluate road safety based on the informa-
tion received from the Topology and Mobility Engine and the Safety Message Management
module. This module periodically sends road safety information to the control plane.
• SDN Strategy Rules: This is a database that contains the rules related to PCS. These
rules describe where, when and how pseudonyms change. The database is regularly up-
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dated by the Strategy Inspector module; based on the information received from the
control plane.
• Strategy Settings: This is a database that contains the settings of the applied strat-
egy such as the duration of radio silence period after the changing of pseudonym. This
database is also regularly updated by the Strategy Inspector module according to the
information received from the control plane.
• Strategy Inspector: this module represents an interface, which communicates with the
PCS module of the control plane. It receives information from the SDN controller(s) and
stores them in two databases: the SDN Strategy rules and the Strategy Settings databases.
This module also forwards these PCS rules and settings to the Strategy Engine module.
• Strategy Engine: this module executes the PCS according to the rules and settings
received from the Strategy Inspector module. To execute the strategy, the module contin-
uously monitors and sends instructions to the Safety Message Management module. This
module provides privacy protection related information to the driver from whom it receives
privacy level recommendations. This module also sends privacy-related information to the
control plane.
4 Case Study
To demonstrate the merit of our proposed architecture, we conducted the following case study.
As shown in Figure 3 (1), we populated a Software-Defined Location Privacy Controller (SDLP)
with four state-of-the-art PCSs: UPCS [12], TAPCS [13], PRIVANET [8] and SocialSpots [14].
In this section, we first show how these strategies are integrated into our architecture. Then, we
illustrate how the SDLP performs a context-aware PCS selection. The context is mainly defined
by mobility and topology, as well as the attacker model. Finally, we conduct a simulation-
based study to demonstrate how our proposed architecture dynamically updates the security
parameters of each strategy.
4.1 PCSs Deployment
Table 1: The deployments of PCSs in the self-privacy-preserving architecture
Mobility and topology Parameter setting Attacker model Privacy model Privacy metric Incentive model
UPCS [12] Signalized intersection
Red traffic light duration:
30s, 60s
Global external passive
and local internal passive
(Semantic and syntactic linking)
No The entropy of the annonymity set No
SocialSpots [14] Signalized intersection Red traffic light turns green
Global external passive
(Syntactic linking)
No The size of the anonymity set Yes
TAPCS [13] Traffic congestion Speed threshold
Global external passive
and local internal passive
(Semantic and syntactic linking)
No The entropy of the anonymity set No
PRIVANET [8]
Roadside Infrastructure
e.g. Gas station
The capacity of RI
The threshold of privacy
Global external passive
and local internal passive
(Semantic and syntactic linking)
Yes The size of the anonymity set Yes
Our proposed architecture is flexible enough to support any state-of-the-art PCS. Table 1
shows how the considered strategies are mapped to our architecture. This table has six columns:
(i) Mobility and topology: specifies the topology where the strategy can be used; (ii) Parameter
Setting: specifies the parameters of the strategy; (iii) Attacker model: specifies that attacker
model from which the strategy provides protection; (iv) Privacy model: specifies if the strategy
uses a privacy model or not; (v) Privacy metric: specifies the metric used to evaluate the
strategy; (vi) Incentive model: specifies if the strategy uses an incentive model or not.
Control plane modules are activated or deactivated according to the requirements of each
PCS. For example, the Incentive Model module is disabled for UPCS and TAPCS since these
8
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Figure 3: The selection of pseudonym changing strategy
strategies do not propose any mechanism to motivate non-cooperative vehicles to change their
pseudonyms; while the Privacy Model module is only activated for PRIVANET strategy.
Figure 3 (2) illustrates different steps for the selection of a PCS. The SDLP first checks
information received from the Mobility and Topology module. For instance, if the vehicle
is entering a signalized intersection, two PCSs could be applied to this context: UPCS and
SocialSpots. To decide which of the two strategies to apply, SDLP checks information received
from the Attacker Model module. If the attacker model can perform both syntactic and semantic
pseudonym linking attacks, then UPCS is selected. Otherwise, if the attacker can perform only
syntactic attacks, SocialSpots is selected. More details on syntactic and semantic pseudonym
linking attacks can be found in [3].
Table 2: The configuration of pseudonym-changing strategies
Strategy Changed context Configuration Action Results
10% of vehicles
in dangerous situation
Pseudonym lock
Low safety risk
Acceptable privacy level
SDN-based UPCS [12] Road safety 20% of vehicles
are in dangerous situation
Pseudonym lock
Low safety risk.
Acceptable privacy level
Simple attacker Select privacy metric The size of the anonymity set
Medium attacker Change the privacy metric The entropy of the anonymity setSDN-based TAPCS [13] Attacker model
Advanced attacker Keep the privacy metric The entropy of the anonymity set
Sensitivity parameter = 0.1 Update privacy model High privacy level
SDN-based PRIVANET [8] Privacy model
Sensitivity parameter = 0.2 Update privacy model Low privacy level
9
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4.2 Simulation Setup
We carried out a simulation-based analysis to demonstrate the merit of our SDN-based and self-
learning architecture and how it dynamically adapts PCS security parameters to the context.
This simulation-based analysis was performed using Veins Simulation Framework [15]. The
considered scenario is similar to that proposed in [8]. Three strategies are simulated: UPCS,
TAPCS, and PRIVANET. SocialSpots was excluded, as it has the same application context
(signalized intersections) as UPCS.
Table 2 details the configurations of the simulated strategies. This table has four columns:
(i) Changed context: specifies the context we change during the simulation; (ii) Configuration:
specifies the values we assign to the context’ parameters; (iii) Action: specifies the action
to perform when the parameter is changed; (iv) Results: specifies the obtained results when
the action is applied. To demonstrate the dynamic changing of PCS parameters according to
context, three different scenarios are considered.
1. Scenario 1: uses UPCS strategy in a road safety context, where the number of vehicles
in a dangerous situation can be 10% or 20%. The pseudonym changing in such a situation
can generate traffic collisions and accidents.
2. Scenario 2: uses TAPCS strategy, where we study how this strategy adapts the privacy
metric to the attacker model. Three configurations of the attacker model are considered:
simple, medium, and advanced.
3. Scenario 3: uses PRIVANET focusing on the privacy model. We consider two configu-
rations of this model by varying the sensitivity parameter value, which characterizes the
power of the adversary.
4.3 Simulation Results
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Figure 4: Static UPCS vs SDN-based UPCS
Figure 4 compares the static implementation UPCS (static UPCS) to its SDN-based variant
(SDN-based UPCS). Two performance indicators are considered: the privacy level and safety.
As shown in Figure 4, static UPCS provides a higher level of privacy protection compared to
10
ar
X
iv
:
so
m
e
ot
h
er
te
x
t
go
es
h
er
e
SDN-based UPCS. However, SDN-based UPCS has a lower safety risk than static UPCS. The
reason for this, as described in Table 2, is that SDLP takes an action to lock pseudonym-
changing processes of vehicles in a dangerous situation. This lock slightly decreases the privacy
protection level, while reducing the safety risk.
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Figure 5: Static TAPCS vs SDN-based TAPCS
Figure 5 makes a comparison between Static TAPCS and SDN-based TAPCS. In Static
TAPCS, the entropy of anonymity set is used as a performance metric, whatever attacker model
is used. However, the SDN-based TAPCS varies the performance metric according to the power
of the attacker. For instance, the size of the anonymity set is chosen when the attacker is simple,
while the entropy of the anonymity set is selected when the attacker is medium or advanced.
In the former case, the probabilities of distinguishing between vehicles are equal and hence
the measuring size of the anonymity set performs well. In the latter case, the distinguishing
probabilities are not equal; hence the need to take the entropy into account.
Finally, we compare the static implementation of PRIVANET and the SDN-based PRI-
VANET. As illustrated in Figure 6, the sensitivity parameter (α), which characterizes the
power of the attacker, remains unchanged in Static PRIVANET and is equal to 0.3. However,
for SDN-based PRIVANET, the sensitivity parameter is updated according to the information
received from the data plane. The change in the power of the attacker (the sensitivity param-
eter) has a direct impact on the privacy level obtained by vehicles. Indeed, as illustrated in
Figure 6, the high values of the average of privacy are obtained when the sensitivity parameter
equals 0.1. However, the lower values of the average of privacy are obtained when the sensitivity
parameter equals 0.3.
5 Conclusion
The imminent deployment of connected vehicles requires significant attention to the security
and privacy aspects. Privacy protection is a critical issue that influences the user acceptance of
this technology. Pseudonym-changing strategies are considered as the key solution to overcome
this acute need. However, the absence of recommended pseudonym-changing strategies (PCSs)
represents an obstacle to achieving this objective. To this end, we propose an innovative archi-
tecture that exploits Software-Defined Networking (SDN), one of the key technologies for 5G
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Figure 6: Static PRIVANET vs. SDN-based PRIVANET
networks. Our proposed architecture is flexible and self-learning and hence can encompass PCSs
proposed so far in the literature and even upcoming PCSs. The selection of the appropriate
PCS and it security settings are context-aware. The control plane is modular and includes the
main building-blocks of PCSs which can support any future solution.
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